Ready
or not . . . we have entered the technology age. This means
new technology to make your life easier . . . or not?
With advancements in
technology come new issues for employers. Many workplaces now have voice
mail, e-mail, Internet access, and pagers. While this technology may
make access to information and people easier and quicker, it also
creates the potential for employees to abuse and/or misuse the systems.
It also raises new concerns about employee privacy. This article will
analyze some of the laws which may be implicated by these issues.
1.
Federal Wiretapping Act
The Federal Wire and
Electronic Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §2510, et seq. (commonly
referred to as the "federal wiretapping act"), prohibits
intentional interceptions of wire, oral or electronic communications.
"Intercept" is defined as "the aural or other acquisition
of the contents of any wire, electronic or oral communication through
the use of any electronic, mechanical or other device." 18 U.S.C.
§2510(4). An exception exists, however, for any "telephone or
telegraph instrument, equipment or facility" furnished to a
subscriber or user of wire or electronic communication services by the
provider of such services and "being used by the subscriber or user
in the ordinary course of its business." 18 U.S.C. §2510(5)(a).
There have been several cases applying this statute, and in particular
the ordinary course of business exception.
In Arias v. Mutual Central
Alarm Service, 202 F.3d 553 (2nd Cir. 2000) the plaintiff claimed
that his employer violated the federal wiretapping act by recording all
conversations on company telephones. Despite a factual dispute as to
whether the employee had consented to the recordings, the Court held
that legitimate business reasons justified the recording of all incoming
and outgoing telephone calls. The business reasons which justified the
recording included protecting sensitive security information and
maintaining accurate records of emergency calls. The practice was also
standard in the industry.
Other courts have agreed that
consent of the employee is not required for the ordinary course of
business exception to apply. See, e.g., Adams v. City of
Battle Creek, 15 IER Cases 254 (W.D.Mich. 1999) (holding that
interception of police officer's pages did not violate the federal
wiretapping act). With respect to the covert nature of the recording,
the Adams court stated:
Covert
monitoring is generally deemed to be undertaken in the ordinary course
of business only if it is "undertaken normally" or is
"justified by a valid business purpose." Berry v. Funk,
146 F.3d 1003, 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
Id. at 256. The Court
concluded that the temporary monitoring of the police officer's pager,
based on a particularized suspicion that the officer was leaking drug
raid information, was justified by a valid business purpose. Although
the statute does not require any balancing of interest, the court noted
that the employer's interest in maintaining a confidentiality of its
investigation was significant and the intrusion on the employee was
minimal. In particular, the court commented that, with one exception,
there was no monitoring of conversations, only a monitoring of incoming
telephone numbers.
Monitoring of telephone calls
based on less serious suspected wrongdoing has also been found to be
within the business exception. See, e.g. Deal v. Spears, 980 F.2d
1153, (8th Cir. 1992) (suspicion of employee's involvement in store
burglary and excessive use of store telephone) and Watkins v. L.M.
Berry & Co., 704 F. 2d 577 (11th Cir. 1983) (Monitoring allowed
to extent necessary to guard against unauthorized use of telephone or to
determine if call is personal).
Thus, although any monitoring
of employee telephone calls or pagers does potentially implicate the
federal wiretapping act, as long as such communications are either
routinely monitored in the ordinary course of the employer's business
or, in the case of individual monitoring, the monitoring is based on a
legitimate business purpose such as suspicion of wrongdoing by the
employee, it is unlikely that a violation of the statute would be found.
While the recording of
telephone calls in the workplace is not a new issue, the monitoring of
e-mails is. If the employer creates a back-up of all data in its
computer system on a daily basis, then any e-mails sent that day, unless
previously deleted, may be stored on that back-up disc. Whether e-mail
will be protected under the federal wiretapping statute is yet to be
seen. However, in a 1996 decision the U.S. District Court for the
District of Nevada ruled that a computer's storage of electronic
communications sent through a paging system was governed by 18 U.S.C.
§2701, et seq., rather than 18 U.S.C. §2501 et seq. Bohach
v. The City of Reno, 932 F.Supp. 1232 (D.Nev. 1996). Section
2701(c)(1) allows the providers of the electronic communication service
to access and use the communications in its electronic storage. Thus,
the Bohach court found that the statute was not violated when the
employer who provided the communication service accessed the stored
communications. Since an employer's retrieval of employee e-mail
communications is achieved through access to stored data rather than by
intercepting the communication as it is made, such access appears to be
permitted under 18 U.S.C. §2701(c)(1).
2.
New Hampshire Law
New Hampshire has adopted its
own version of the wiretapping law. Similar to the federal law, N.H.
R.S.A. 570-A prohibits the interception of communications but recognizes
an exception for recording or monitoring done in the "ordinary
course of business." N.H. R.S.A. 570-A:2, IV. While there are no
New Hampshire cases applying N.H. R.S.A. 570-A in the workplace, it can
be assumed that our courts would reach conclusions similar to those
reached by the federal courts applying the federal statute.
Unlike the federal wiretapping
law, the New Hampshire statute does not contain a provision relating to
storage of and access to electronic communications. Nonetheless, the
analysis applied in Bohach, supra, seems applicable here.
Where e-mails are retrieved after they have been stored on the system's
back-up, there has been no "interception" and hence no
violation of the statute.
The availability of e-mail and
Internet access in the workplace also can lead to employee misuse of
such technology, resulting in decreased productivity and potentially
inappropriate material (i.e., e-mail jokes, etc.) being circulated
through the workplace. Fortunately, employers do have the right to adopt
and enforce policies which limit employee use of e-mail and the
Internet. Just as with the use of telephone and other office resources,
employers may limit the use of e-mail and the Internet to business
purposes. The real challenge is in enforcing such policies. Not only is
it difficult to monitor such use, but employers often do allow use of
the e-mail system for non-business purposes. The key to a valid and
effective policy is clear and consistent enforcement.
(1)
There is also a New Hampshire
statute which prohibits the use of a "pen register," which is
defined as a device which identifies the telephone number dialed on the
telephone line to which the device is attached. N.H. R.S.A. 570-B:1, III.
However, there is an exception for devices used by a "customer of
telecommunication service for cost accounting or other like purposes in
the ordinary course of its business." Id. Although there are
no New Hampshire cases interpreting this statute, it can be assumed that
employers who have such devices installed on all telephone lines for
purposes of tracking telephone use by employees would fall within this
exception.
In addition to the statutory
provisions discussed above, an employer's ability to monitor employee
telephone calls and retrieve employee e-mail raises the possibility of a
common law invasion of privacy claim. The New Hampshire Supreme Court has
recognized four distinct interests which are protected under the general
right to privacy:
Hamburger v. Eastman, 106
N.H. 107, 112 (1964). The only New Hampshire case to deal with an
employee's right to privacy in the employment context has been O'Brien
v. Papa Gino's of America, Inc., 780 F.2d 1067 (1st Cir. 1986). That
case concerned the employer's requirement that an employee submit to a
polygraph test during which he was asked about matters unrelated to his
employment. Following his termination for lying on the polygraph, the
employee sued for wrongful discharge, invasion of privacy and defamation.
The jury found for the employer on the wrongful discharge claim but
awarded the employee $448,200 on his invasion of privacy and defamation
claims. The judgment was upheld by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit.
Although the Papa Gino's
case demonstrates the risks associated with taking actions in the
workplace which might be reasonably regarded as invasive of privacy, if
implemented correctly, employer monitoring of telephone calls and e-mails
should not give rise to such liability. Employers ought to adopt policies
advising employees of the permitted and prohibited uses of such
technology. In addition, the best way to defend an invasion of privacy
claim with respect to e-mail would be to advise employees in such policies
that e-mails are stored on the back-up system. If provided such warning,
employees would have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their e-mail
communications. Also, although neither the federal nor the state
wiretapping statutes require consent under the exception for business use,
if all telephone calls are recorded, it would advisable to so notify
employees. Again, if so informed, employees would have no reasonable
expectation of privacy in any of their telephone conversations. Obviously,
if an employer is recording only the telephone conversations of a
particular employee on the basis of suspicion of wrongdoing, notice to the
employee would not be appropriate. However, in those cases, the employer's
purpose ought to be scrutinized closely to be sure that it is a valid
business purpose.
In an interesting case entitled Intel
Corp. v. Hamidi, Intel Corp. brought suit in the
Sacramento, California, Superior Court to enjoin Hamidi, a former employee, from accessing
its e-mail system to send negative messages about Intel to
thousands of its employees. Hamidi argued that he had a
constitutional right to access the company's internal e-mail system and
that any efforts to limit his access would violate his rights. The court
disagreed and issued a preliminary injunction against Hamidi on November
24, 1998. Final judgment was issued in favor of Intel on June 23,
1999. At this writing, the case is wending its way through the
California appellate court system.
Although not directly addressing the issue of
employee privacy, Hamidi does indicate that employers may have
some proprietary rights which are paramount to employee rights.
Accordingly, an employer may prohibit use of its e-mail system to
broadcast messages contrary to the company's best interest. In addition,
an employer may prohibit employees from receiving outside e-mail.
Employers wishing to limit use of their e-mail systems in such fashions
ought to adopt policies which clearly state the restrictions.
4.
Conclusion
As the above discussion ought to
make clear, technology has advanced more rapidly than the law in these
areas. Thus, we can expect to continue seeing cases which further refine
the limits of an employer's ability to monitor employee communications and
which further define employee rights in these areas. Employers are advised
to adopt and enforce clear policies which set forth the employer's
expectations on these issues. However, since this is a developing area of
law, employers must also keep abreast of changes in the law which might
affect the enforceability of their policies.
Notes:
1.
Employers are cautioned that enforcement of policies which restrict
employee communications or access to employees may become an issue if the
employer is ever faced with a unionization campaign. The National Labor
Relations Board will likely find that the employer has committed an unfair
labor practice if such a policy is implemented or enforced in order to
restrict or prohibit communications relating to the union, where other
non-business communications are or have been permitted. On the other hand,
as long as it is consistently enforced, a business-only policy for use of
the e-mail system should not result in the finding of an unfair labor
practice.